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I. INTRODUCTION
When rebels from neighboring countries crossed the border and
fomented rebellion, the government in Nafissatou’s country responded
with a brutal crackdown.1 Nafissatou and her husband, devout Muslims,
decried the violence on both sides.2 After destroying their home, soldiers
took Nafissatou and her husband into custody.3 In jail, soldiers repeatedly beat both of them and gang raped Nafissatou.4 After her husband died
of his wounds, a neighbor came to Nafissatou’s aid and helped her escape.5 Eventually, Nafissatou arrived in the United States and applied for
asylum.6
Fauziya, a seventeen-year-old girl and the youngest daughter of a
privileged family, attended a boarding school.7 Her father advocated ed*

J.D. Candidate 2015.
1. The precise story that Nafissatou Diallo related on her asylum application and in her interview is unclear. It has been compiled here from the following sources, hereinafter referred to as the
Diallo Sources: BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: GUINEA (2003), available at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27731.htm; Sam Dolnick, Immigrants May Be Fed False
Stories to Bolster Asylum Pleas, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/
nyregion/immigrants-may-be-fed-false-stories-to-bolster-asylum-pleas.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0;
Jim Dwyer, With False Tale About Gang Rape, Strauss-Kahn Case Crumbles, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/24/nyregion/housekeepers-false-tale-undid-strauss-kahncase.html?_r=0; Jim Dwyer & Michael Wilson, Strauss-Kahn Accuser’s Call Alarmed Prosecutors,
N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/nyregion/one-revelation-afteranother-undercut-strauss-kahn-accusers-credibility.html?pagewanted=all; Matt Williams, Dominique
Strauss-Kahn Settles Sexual Assault Case with Hotel Maid, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2012),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/10/dominique-strauss-kahn-case-settled.
2. See Diallo Sources, supra note 1.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358–59 (B.I.A. 1996); Karen Musalo, In Re: Fauziya
Kasinga: Brief for the Respondent, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUDIES 373, 378 (1998).
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ucation for girls and opposed both polygamous marriages and female
genital mutilation (FGM).8 When Fauziya’s father died, however, his
property and family reverted to the control of paternal relatives.9
Fauziya’s paternal aunt halted her education, contracted for her to enter a
polygamous marriage with a man thirty years her senior, and made arrangements for her “circumcision”.10 Fauziya’s sister and her aunt came
to her aid: they pooled their money, took Fauziya to the nearest airport,
and put her on the first international flight.11 With help from kindly
strangers, Fauziya eventually arrived in the United States and applied for
asylum.12
Every day, Asylum Officers (AOs) and Immigration Judges (IJs)
hear cases like these. Their task is to determine if the asylum seeker has a
genuine claim to protection under the Refugee Act, which prohibits returning a refugee to a country where her life or freedom is threatened due
to race, religion, political opinion, nationality, or membership in a particular social group.13 AOs and IJs are aware that their decision may mean
life or death for an asylum seeker.14 They are also aware that false claims
are “distressingly common,”15 that unscrupulous attorneys and unauthorized practitioners of immigration law have perpetrated fraudulent asylum
schemes,16 and that granting asylum where it is not merited encourages
asylum fraud and weakens the immigration system.17

8. Musalo, supra note 7, at 378.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 379–80.
11. Id. at 380–81.
12. Id. at 381–82.
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2009).
14. ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
INTERVIEWING PART I: OVERVIEW OF NONADVERSARIAL ASYLUM INTERVIEW 5 (2006) [hereinafter
AOBTC INTERVIEWING PART I], available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/
Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/Interview%20
Part-Overview-Nonadversarial-Asylum-Interview-31aug10.pdf (“An applicant wrongly found ineligible for asylum status may . . . eventually . . . face persecution or death.”).
15. Angov v. Holder, 736 F.3d 1263, 1270 (9th Cir. 2013). See also GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-08-9353, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM: AGENCIES HAVE TAKEN ACTIONS TO HELP ENSURE
QUALITY IN THE ASYLUM ADJUDICATION PROCESS, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN (2008) [hereinafter
GAO ASYLUM REPORT] (detailing concerns of AOs and IJs regarding making accurate decisions on
asylum claims).
16. See, e.g., Pavlov v. Holder, 697 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2012) (detailing evidence of a false
application racket); Dhariwal v. Mayorkas, CV 11-2593 PSG, 2011 WL 6779314, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 27, 2011) (describing evidence that law firm had submitted over one thousand fraudulent asylum applications).
17. Monica Schurtman & Monique C. Lillard, Remedial and Preventive Responses to the Unauthorized Practice of Immigration Law, 20 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 60 (2014) (describing the
systemic as well as personal harm resulting from immigration fraud).
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The American immigration system poses challenges to both the
asylum seeker and the decisionmakers. Immigration law has been described as a “labyrinth,” similar in complexity to the Internal Revenue
Code.18 Asylum seekers are often unrepresented, unfamiliar with the law,
and nonfluent in English.19 Yet, even immigrants who are represented by
counsel may still be at a disadvantage; according to one study, the level
of representation in immigration is the worst of any civil field.20 In addition, asylum claims depend heavily—sometimes entirely—on the credibility of the applicant. Due to the difficulty in obtaining documentary and
testimonial evidence regarding conditions of persecution, the asylum
seeker’s own testimony is often the only evidence.21 The consistency,
detail, and specificity with which an asylum seeker relates her story—
particularly the most traumatic events—is of prime importance to the
determination of whether or not asylum is granted.22
AOs and IJs work within an overburdened system. IJs are under
enormous pressure to hear claims quickly; in 2006, IJs were expected to
hear 1,400 cases per year, or nearly twenty-seven per week.23 In some
immigration courts, those already high numbers have skyrocketed. A
2014 Washington Post investigation revealed that an IJ in Arlington had
twenty-six cases scheduled in one morning, resulting in an average of
seven minutes per case.24 In addition, a 2008 study by the Government
18. Escobar-Grijalva v. INS, 206 F.3d 1331, 1335 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Castro-O'Ryan v.
U.S. Dep’t of Immigration and Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1987)).
19. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2012 STATISTICAL
YEAR BOOK, at G1 (2013) [hereinafter EOIR 2012 YEAR BOOK], available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy12syb.pdf (reporting that 56% of respondents were represented in removal cases in FY 2012).
20. Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of Legal Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 331 (2011) (reporting that fifty-seven percent of federal appellate
judges find immigration the field of law in which they perceive the most significant disparities in
legal representation). An indicator of the extent of the problem is the online list of immigration practitioners currently under discipline for professional misconduct. Exec. Office for Immigration Review, List of Currently Disciplined Practitioners, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 18, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/discipline.htm.
21. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2013) (stating that the applicant’s testimony alone
may be sufficient to establish eligibility for asylum); Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 26 (2d Cir.
1999) (“[I]t must be acknowledged that a genuine refugee does not flee her native country armed
with affidavits, expert witnesses, and extensive documentation.”).
22. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2009). See also Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1041
(9th Cir. 2010) (explaining the standards for credibility determinations).
23. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 295, 383 (2007) (quoting Second Circuit Chief Judge John M. Walker. Walker continued, “I
fail to see how Immigration Judges can be expected to make thorough and competent findings of fact
and conclusions of law under these circumstances.”).
24. Eli Saslow, In a Crowded Immigration Court, Seven Minutes to Decide a Family’s Future,
WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-a-crowded-immigration-
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Accountability Office found that 82% of IJs and 65% of AOs believe
they have insufficient time to thoroughly adjudicate cases.25 The pressure
to hear ever more cases also leads to a lack of training and professional
development: a majority of AOs and IJs cited a need for increased ongoing training, especially in assessing credibility and detecting fraud.26 Significant inconsistencies in the grant rates between and within asylum offices and immigration courts are a further indication of the burdens on
the system.27 In the cases of Nafissatou and Fauziya, one woman was
telling the truth, and one woman was lying.28 The fraudulent claim succeeded while the genuine claim was denied.29
The cry for immigration reform is growing stronger. Many proposals advocate substantive reforms to asylum law, including broadening
asylum protections and streamlining asylum procedures;30 granting rights
of discovery in immigration court;31 and establishing an inquisitorial,
rather than an adversarial, system for asylum proceedings.32 Substantive
reforms, however, require congressional action and are mired in political
debate.33 This Note proposes a procedural reform to the affirmative asylum process: the direct and proactive disclosure of routine documents in
the applicant’s file, bypassing the need for a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) request.34 This reform is politically feasible because it is within
court-seven-minutes-to-decide-a-familys-future/2014/02/02/518c3e3e-8798-11e3-a5bd844629433ba3_story.html?hpid=z4.
25. GAO ASYLUM REPORT, supra note 15, at 58, 70.
26. Id. at 5, 22.
27. Rachel D. Settlage, Affirmatively Denied: The Detrimental Effects of a Reduced Grant Rate
for Affirmative Asylum Seekers, 27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 61, 79–81 (2009) (discussing inconsistent grant
rates among and between asylum offices and recommending increased training and decreased workload for AOs). See also Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 23, at 378 (analyzing the inconsistency in
grant rates and concluding that “[w]hether an asylum applicant is able to live safely in the United
States or is deported to a country in which he claims to fear persecution is very seriously influenced
by a spin of the wheel of chance; that is, by a clerk’s random assignment of an applicant’s case to
one asylum officer rather than another, or one immigration judge rather than another.”).
28. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 364 (B.I.A. 1996); Dwyer, supra note 1.
29. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 364; Dwyer, supra note 1.
30. See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744,
113th Cong. (2013).
31. See Geoffrey Heeren, Shattering the One-Way Mirror Discovery in Immigration Court, 79
BROOK. L. REV. 1569, 1569 (2014).
32. See Won Kidane, The Inquisitorial Advantage in Removal Proceedings, 45 AKRON L. REV.
647, 647 (2012).
33. See, e.g., Ashley Parker & Jonathan Weisman, After Deriding G.O.P. on Immigration Bill,
Boehner
Shifts
His
Aim
to
Obama,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
29,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/us/politics/immigration-bill-hinges-on-new-obama-attitudeboehner-says.html.
34. For a discussion of the challenges of using FOIA to obtain immigration records, see Larry
R. Fleurantin, Immigration Law: Nowhere to Turn—Illegal Aliens Cannot Use the Freedom of In-
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agency discretion and requires no legislative action.35 While proactive
disclosure in affirmative asylum adjudications is not a substitute for
comprehensive immigration reform, it is a pragmatic step that would improve efficiency, lower administrative costs, increase confidence in the
immigration system, and lead to fairer and more accurate determinations
of credibility.
Part II begins with an overview of asylum law, including its history,
the extent of the refugee population, eligibility requirements, and the application process. Part III describes the procedure for those asylum seekers whose claims are referred to immigration courts, while Part IV describes the inefficient and burdensome process for obtaining immigration
records. Part V proposes that documents concerning the asylum seeker’s
application be proactively disclosed at the time the applicant is referred
to an immigration court and describes two prerequisites to implementation: a shift in approach on the part of the referring agency and an expansion of AO authority so that the AO makes preliminary decisions about
disclosure. Part VI concludes with a summary of the need for procedural
changes and the benefits of adopting procedures that facilitate a freer
exchange of information.
II. ASYLUM LAW: AN OVERVIEW
A. International Roots of American Asylum Law
American asylum law is based on international agreements that
were assembled following World War I and were expanded and solidified following World War II.36 In response to the hundreds of thousands
of war refugees who had not yet been permanently resettled years after
formation Act as a Discovery Tool to Fight Unfair Removal Hearings, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 155, 155 (2008).
35. Proactive disclosure is not only within agency discretion, it is in accord with policy guidelines from the current Administration and from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Attorney General Holder’s Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies Concerning
the Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 51879 (Mar. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Holder Memo],
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2009/06/24/foia-memo-march2009
.pdf; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2013 CHIEF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT OFFICER REPORT TO
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (2013) [hereinafter DHS 2013 CHIEF FOIA OFFICER REPORT], available
at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/Reports/Final%20DHS%202013chief-foia-officer-report-final_0.pdf.
36. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’N FOR REFUGEES, THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO
THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL 1 (2011) [hereinafter UNHCR 1951
CONVENTION], available at http://www.unhcr.org/4ec262df9.html. See also DEBORAH E. ANKER,
LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (Paul T. Lufkin ed., 1999) (discussing that asylum status,
withholding of removal, and refugee status are all based on provisions from the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol ratified by the United States in 1968).
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the close of World War II, the international community (through the
United Nations) ratified the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951 (1951 Convention) and later, the 1967 Protocol.37
The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol remain the foundational documents in international asylum law and serve as the basis for
American asylum law.38 They codify the belief that nation-states have a
responsibility to protect fundamental human rights: if an alien has a
“well-founded fear of being persecuted” in her home country, the Convention and Protocol prohibit returning her to that country.39 The Convention and Protocol define “refugee,” specify the legal protection and
social rights a refugee is entitled to receive, and outline the obligations of
a refugee towards a host country.40 The United States fully recognized
the refugee rights established by the international community with the
Refugee Act of 1980.41
B. The Global and Domestic Refugee Population
While the UN Convention and U.S. asylum law establish the right
of individuals to seek asylum, they do not oblige nation-states to accept
refugees for resettlement.42 Because there are many more refugees than
host countries are willing to accept, refugees often spend years in limbo,
unable to return home but without permanent legal status in another
country.43 Of the 10.4 million refugees worldwide, nearly 7.1 million
have been living in temporary exile for five years or more.44 In 2012, less

37. UNHCR 1951 CONVENTION, supra note 36, at 1.
38. See Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History
of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 9 (1981); DANIEL C. MARTIN & JAMES E.
YANKAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2012
2 (2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2012.pdf [hereinafter DHS ANNUAL FLOW REPORT].
39. UNHCR 1951 CONVENTION, supra note 36, at 3.
40. Id. at 4–5.
41. Edward M. Kennedy, Refugee Act of 1980, 15 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 141, 145 (1981).
42. DIV. OF INT’L PROT., UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’N FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR
RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK 5 (2011) [hereinafter UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK], available
at http://www.unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.pdf.
43. Id. at 17.
44. The figure of 10.4 million includes only those refugees who remain in temporary living
conditions; it does not include refugees who have been granted permanent residence in another country or have been repatriated. The figure also excludes the 4.8 million Palestinians registered as refugees and living in 60 camps in the Middle East. UNHCR GLOBAL REPORT 2012, FINDING DURABLE
SOLUTIONS 3 (2012), available at http://www.unhcr.org/51b1d61d0.html. For a more detailed description of refugee and IDP numbers, see UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 5.
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than 1% of the world’s refugees were granted resettlement in a host
country.45
Domestically, refugees (immigrants who enter the United States
with legal status as refugees) and asylum seekers (immigrants who seek
refugee status after entering the United States) make up a small percentage of immigrants to the United States.46 In 2011, the United States
granted residency to 31,396 refugees, less than 3% of the total legal immigrants for that year.47 That same year, approximately 48,000 people
applied for asylum and about half of that number were successful in their
request;48 asylees (asylum seekers who have been granted refugee status)
thus represented about 2% of legal immigrants in 2011.49 However, the
stakes are high for this small number of asylum seekers. People without
legal status who have a legitimate fear of returning to their home country
are particularly vulnerable to exploitation, trafficking, and sexual or gender-based violence.50 In order to gain legal status and a measure of security, these asylum seekers must demonstrate that they meet several conditions of eligibility.
C. Conditions of Eligibility
Asylum is a discretionary grant of lawful permanent residency that
may be granted upon a showing that the applicant meets the definition of
a refugee and does not face any statutory bars.51 A refugee located outside of the United States applies for refugee status through the Refugee
Admissions Program.52 A refugee within the United States, called an
“asylum seeker,” applies for refugee status either affirmatively through
45. UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 17.
46. A refugee applies for and is granted residency from outside the United States; an asylum
seeker is already present in the United States when she applies for residency. DEP’T OF STATE,
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES FACTSHEET (2013) [hereinafter RESETTLEMENT
FACTSHEET], available at http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2013/203578.htm. See also
8 U.S.C. §§ 1521, 1522 (2014).
47. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2011 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 48 (2011) [hereinafter DHS 2011 IMMIGRATION YEARBOOK], available at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2011/ois_yb_
2011.pdf (figure based on 1,062,040 new lawful permanent residents).
48. EOIR 2012 YEAR BOOK, supra note 19, at K1.
49. DHS 2011 IMMIGRATION YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at 11, 48.
50. See, e.g., UNHCR GLOBAL APPEAL 2012–2013, http://www.unhcr.org/ga12/index.xml (last
visited Mar. 18, 2015) (discussing the need to protect refugees from gender-based violence, human
trafficking, discrimination and xenophobia); UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at
3, 6 (stating that 48% of refugees are female, 46% are under 18 years of age, and a small but growing number are unaccompanied minors).
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2009).
52. RESETTLEMENT FACTSHEET, supra note 46. See also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1521, 1522 (2014).
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United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) or defensively in immigration court.53 Whatever the route, persons seeking refugee status have the burden of establishing that they meet a three-part
standard.
First, the person must be outside his or her country of nationality or
habitual residence.54 Many local conflicts cause enormous upheaval of
populations within a country’s own borders. In 2013, for example, the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that
over two million Syrians fled their homes in search of safer areas within
Syria.55 Those displaced from one area of a country to another are known
as “Internally Displaced Persons” (IDPs); IDPs are eligible for various
types of international aid, but are not eligible for refugee status.56
Second, the person must have “a well-founded fear of persecution”
on account of a protected status: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.57 This second element
distinguishes refugees from migrants.58 A migrant may have pressing
reasons to relocate, such as a lack of economic or educational opportunities in her home country, widespread crime, a desire to reunite with family, or the need to escape the aftermath of a natural disaster. In contrast, a
refugee has fled her country because of targeted persecution directed towards her because of her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
social group.
Third, the home country must be unable or unwilling to protect the
person from the persecution she fears.59 Again, this element serves to
distinguish refugees from migrants. A migrant continues to enjoy the
protection of his or her own government, even while abroad; a refugee
has a “well-founded fear” that the government of her home country will
not or cannot offer protection from the targeted persecution.60
A person who meets the three-part definition may nevertheless be
barred from refugee status. The “persecutor bar” prohibits granting asylum to refugees who formerly persecuted others.61 Various criminal con-

53. RESETTLEMENT FACTSHEET, supra note 46. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2009); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.2(b) (2009).
54. See 8 U.S.C § 101(a)(42)(A) (2013).
55. UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 5.
56. 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(42) (2013); UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 5.
57. 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(42)(A) (2013); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2009).
58. UNHCR 1951 CONVENTION, supra note 36, at 3.
59. 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(42)(A) (2013).
60. UNHCR 1951 CONVENTION, supra note 36, at 3.
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(1) (2009). The “persecutor bar” is also part of international law.
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’N FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK AND GUIDELINES ON PROCEDURES
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victions also render a person ineligible for asylum.62 Applicants who
have been granted resettlement in one host country may not use refugee
status to receive resettlement in another host country.63 In addition, asylum applicants located in the United States must apply within one year of
arriving.64
D. The Application Process
Asylum claims in the United States fall into two categories: defensive and affirmative.65 Applicants who are in removal proceedings may
assert asylum as a defense against removal, while applicants who are not
in removal proceedings may assert an affirmative asylum claim.66
1. Defensive Asylum Claims
Any person who entered the United States without permission,
overstayed legal permission to reside in the United States, or whose legal
permission to reside in the United States was revoked due to a criminal
conviction is subject to removal.67 Removal proceedings are initiated
when Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—the law enforcement division of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—issues a
Notice to Appear in immigration court.68 A defensive asylum application
is an avenue to request relief: the applicant argues that she should not be
removed to her home country because she meets the definition of a refugee.69 The proceeding is an adversarial hearing before an IJ.70 An ICE
trial attorney represents the government interest and the applicant either
represents herself or obtains counsel at no expense to the government.71
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 24 (1992), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.html.
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv) (2009).
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2009).
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2009).
65. DHS ANNUAL FLOW REPORT, supra note 38, at 4.
66. Id.
67. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2013); 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2008). USCIS maintains an excellent explanation of the asylum process on its website, available at http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees
-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states.
68. 8 C.F.R § 1239.1(a) (2004).
69. Fauziya, referenced in the Introduction, filed a defensive asylum claim. See In re Kasinga,
21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (B.I.A. 1996). It is unclear whether Nafissatou, also referenced in the Introduction, filed a defensive or an affirmative claim. See Dwyer, supra note 1.
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2006). In the case of expedited removal, the applicant is first screened
by an AO for “credible fear.” If the applicant is determined to have credible fear of persecution in
her home country, she is referred to an IJ for a hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(a) (2011).
71. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.16 (2008). The majority of defensive asylum claims are filed by immigrants awaiting removal in immigration detention centers. While the overall rate of representation in
AND
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In 2012, 35% of defensive asylum claims were granted, allowing 11,978
persons to successfully defend their removal.72
2. Affirmative Asylum Claims
In 2012, USCIS granted 72% of affirmative asylum applications,
recognizing 17,506 applicants as asylees.73 Applicants who are physically present in the United States and are not in removal proceedings may
assert an affirmative asylum claim.74 Affirmative asylum applicants include persons in the United States with temporary legal status—usually
persons with a visitor, student, or work visa—who fear returning to their
home country when their visa expires, as well as persons who are in violation of status but have not yet come to the attention of ICE.75 As mentioned before, affirmative applications are filed with another division of
DHS, the Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS).
The requirements are largely the same in the defensive and affirmative asylum application processes. In both cases, the applicant must show
that she meets the definition of a refugee, that she is credible, and that
she is not barred from obtaining asylum.76 However, defensive and affirmative claims are adjudicated by different government agencies.77 Defensive claims are heard directly by a branch of the Department of Justice (the Executive Office for Immigration Review, or EOIR), with the
ICE attorney representing DHS opposing the claim.78 In contrast, affirmative claims are heard first by the Asylum Division of USCIS, a branch

immigration court is 56%, the rate for detainees is much lower; by some estimates, 80% of detained
immigrants represent themselves. See Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained
Immigrants Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 541, 575 (2009) (citing NINA SIULC ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING EFFICIENCY
AND PROMOTING JUSTICE IN THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: LESSONS FROM THE LEGAL ORIENTATION
PROGRAM 1 (2008), available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/LOP_
Evaluation_May2008_final.pdf).
72. DHS ANNUAL FLOW REPORT, supra note 38, at 5. See also EOIR 2012 YEAR BOOK, supra
note 19, at A1.
73. DHS ANNUAL FLOW REPORT, supra note 38, at 5. See also EOIR 2012 YEAR BOOK, supra
note 19, at A1.
74. DHS ANNUAL FLOW REPORT, supra note 38, at 5.
75. For an excellent explanation of the asylum process, including a chart of who is eligible to
apply affirmatively, see Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-unitedstates (last updated Mar. 10, 2011).
76. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2009).
77. See, e.g., Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-unitedstates (last updated Mar. 10, 2011).
78. Id.
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of DHS.79 When an affirmative asylum claim is filed, it is USCIS that
accesses information about the applicant, conducts an interview, and
makes a first decision.
(a). The Reasonable Fear Interview
As a branch of DHS, USCIS has broad power to locate information
that may concern the applicant. When USCIS receives an asylum application, the agency’s first step is to add the application to the applicant’s
“Alien file,” commonly referred to as an “A-file.”80 In Gonzales & Gonzales Bonds & Insurance Agency Inc. v. United States Department of
Homeland Security, DHS provided a nonexclusive list of the documents
that may be contained in an A-file such as naturalization certificates;
birth and marriage certificates; reports of arrests and investigations;
family history; travel history; education history; employment history;
criminal history; professional accreditation information; governmentissued identification information (i.e., passport, driver’s license); arrival/departure information (record number, expiration date, class of admission, etc.); FBI Identification Number; and Fingerprint Identification
Number.81
The application is assigned to an AO, who reviews the application
and other documents in the A-file in preparation for an interview with the
applicant.82 The AO has broad discretion in conducting the interview.83
The AO is instructed “to elicit all relevant and useful information bearing
on the applicant’s eligibility for asylum” in order to determine if the applicant is credible, if she meets the definition of a refugee, and if she has
any bars to asylum.84 The applicant is not required to present witnesses
or documentary evidence, but may do so if she wishes.85

79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Privacy Act; Alien File (A-File) and Central Index System (CIS) Systems of
Records, 72 Fed. Reg. 1755–02, 1757 (2007) (“The hardcopy paper A-File . . . contains all the individual’s official record material such as: naturalization certificates; . . . applications and petitions for
benefits under the immigration and nationality laws; reports of investigations; . . . correspondence;
and memoranda on each individual for whom DHS has created a record.”).
81. Gonzales & Gonzales Bonds & Ins. Agency Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 913 F.
Supp. 2d 865, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
82. AOBTC INTERVIEWING PART I, supra note 14, at 11–12.
83. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (2011). See also ASYLUM DIVISION, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM PROCEDURES MANUAL (2013) [hereinafter
AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL], available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/native
documents/Asylum_Procedures_Manual_2013.pdf.
84. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (2011).
85. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.9(c), (e) (2011).
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The AO takes “clearly written and comprehensive notes,” which
serve as the only record of the interview.86 In most cases, the applicant
does not see or review the notes.87 Under USCIS guidelines, interview
notes should indicate “that the asylum officer pursued all relevant lines
of questioning” and should include information bearing on credibility
and eligibility.88 AO notes should provide an “accurate and objective
record of the interview.”89 The AO should exercise care even in punctuation because “even an exclamation point placed in reaction to a portion
of the applicant’s testimony may appear as a judgment on the applicant’s
claim.”90
Following the interview, the AO performs her own research.91 She
may consult with foreign embassies and verify the genuineness of any
documentary evidence submitted.92 She may rely upon material from the
Department of State “or other credible sources, such as international
organizations, private voluntary agencies, news organizations, or academic institutions.”93 The AO also considers indicia of credibility such
as the internal consistency of the applicant’s story and the consistency of
the applicant’s story with external evidence.94
(b). Decisions of the Asylum Officer
If the AO grants asylum, the applicant has succeeded and the case
is at an end. If the AO does not grant asylum, the procedure differs based
on the status of the applicant.95 If the applicant has legal status in the
United States—an applicant with a current student visa, for example—
86. ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVICES, INTERVIEWING PART 2: NOTE-TAKING 3 (2006) [hereinafter AOBTC INTERVIEWING
PART 2], available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%
26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/Interview-Part-2-Notetaking-31aug10.pdf.
See also AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 83, at 21.
87. If the applicant reveals information that leads the AO to believe that she may face a statutory bar to asylum, the AO switches from standard note-taking format to sworn question and answer
format. In that case, the applicant reviews and signs the question and answer notes. AOBTC
INTERVIEWING PART 2, supra note 86, at 6.
88. Id. at 5.
89. Id. at 5–6.
90. Id. at 6.
91. AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 83, at 21–22.
92. Id.
93. 8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (2011).
94. ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVICES, ASYLUM ELIGIBILITY PART IV: BURDEN OF PROOF, STANDARDS OF PROOF, AND
EVIDENCE 19 (2006), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/
Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/Burden-of-Proof-StandardsProof-Evidence-31aug01.pdf. See also AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 83, at 21−22.
95. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c) (2011).
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the AO issues to the applicant a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID).96 The
NOID explains in detail the grounds on which the AO intends to deny
the application.97 The applicant has sixteen days to respond to the NOID;
she may submit her own written explanation of any inconsistencies or
discrepancies noted by the AO, affidavits from experts or people familiar
with her claim, or other documentary evidence.98 For example, if the
NOID states that country reports do not corroborate the applicant’s story,
the applicant may submit affidavits by experts regarding current country
conditions.99
In contrast, if the applicant does not have legal status, the AO prepares a detailed Assessment to Refer, which contains the same basic information as a NOID.100 The AO does not, however, issue the Assessment to the applicant.101 The AO adds the Assessment to Refer to the Afile, and the entire file is transferred to the ICE office and ICE attorney
who will oppose the asylum claim in immigration court.102 The applicant
receives only a Notice to Appear in immigration court.103 The Notice to
Appear—also called a Referral Notice—informs the applicant that she
must appear at a hearing, and that if her claim is rejected, a removal order will be issued.104 While regulations require that a referral to immigration court “state the basis for . . . referral [of the application] and include
an assessment of the applicant’s credibility[,]”105 in practice, the referral
gives only the most general idea of the basis for the AO’s decision.106
One typical referral stated: “Your testimony at the asylum interview was
not credible on material points of your claim.”107

96. AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 83, at 24. See also ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC
TRAINING COURSE, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, DECISION WRITING PART 1:
OVERVIEW AND COMPONENTS, FOCUSING OF 1ST THREE COMPONENTS 7–10 (2006) [hereinafter
AOBTC WRITING PART 1], available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitar
ian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/Decision-Writing-Part-1Overview-Components-31aug10.pdf.
97. AOBTC WRITING PART 1, supra note 96, at 7–10.
98. AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 83, at 34–35.
99. See, e.g., Leia v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 427, 437 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that outdated country
reports may be insufficient to establish current country conditions).
100. AOBTC WRITING PART 1, supra note 96, at 12.
101. Id.
102. AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 83, at 28−29.
103. Id.
104. Id. See also AOBTC WRITING PART 1, supra note 96, at 11.
105. 8 C.F.R. § 208.19 (2009).
106. See, e.g., Kaur v. INS, 237 F.3d 1098, 1099, opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 249
F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2001).
107. Id.
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The out-of-status applicant is thus referred to immigration court
with very little idea of why her claim was not granted and with no idea of
what evidence the AO relied upon in reaching the decision. The resulting
imbalance of information creates a burden for the applicant, the agency,
and the court.
III. THE ASYLUM SEEKER REFERRED TO IMMIGRATION COURT
The hearing before the IJ is adversarial and appears at first glance
much like a hearing in civil or criminal court: the applicant presents her
claim for asylum while DHS, represented by an ICE trial attorney, opposes her claim.108 Upon closer examination, however, the hearing in
immigration court is unique in several respects.
A. The Nature of an Asylum Hearing at an Immigration Court
Unlike the criminal court system, immigration courts do not offer
the presumption of innocence109 or right to counsel,110 and the asylum
seeker has the burden of proving that she is eligible for relief from removal and that she merits a discretionary grant of asylum.111 Immigration
courts are not bound by the rules of evidence and the IJ has broad discretion to admit into the record any evidence that she finds relevant and not
fundamentally unfair.112 Unlike the civil court system, immigration
courts have no meaningful right of discovery.113 To access the Assessment to Refer or any of the other records in the A-file, the applicant must
file a FOIA request seeking documents from the very agency that is
prosecuting her; even then, documents are frequently withheld.114

108. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2006).
109. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
110. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.16(b) (1997).
111. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
112. See In re Ponce-Hernandez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 784 (B.I.A. 1999); see also Matter of Toro,
17 I. & N. Dec. 340 (B.I.A. 1980). Hearsay, for example, is frequently admitted. See, e.g., RojasGarcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 823–24 (9th Cir. 2003); Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 729
(7th Cir. 2001); Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1990).
113. Heeren, supra note 31, at 1580–84 (limited discovery provisions have been applied so
narrowly and so infrequently that they do not provide equal access to information). For instances of
narrow discovery interpretation in immigration proceedings, see In re Mohammad J.A. Khalifah, 21
I. & N. Dec. 107, 112 (B.I.A. 1995) (finding no prejudice in the IJ’s denial of the respondent’s motion to subpoena a witness and for production of documents in possession of other government agencies); Matter of Duran, 20 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (B.I.A. 1989) (finding that the IJ properly denied the
respondent’s motion to subpoena government records); Matter of Escobar, 16 I. & N. Dec. 52, 53
(B.I.A. 1976) (affirming denial of a motion for discovery).
114. See, e.g., Martins v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115–
17 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (detailing documents withheld despite FOIA requests). See also Heeran, supra
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The judge’s role is unique in immigration court. In addition to
weighing the parties’ competing arguments, the IJ has “an affirmative
duty to develop the record.”115 Especially when an immigrant is unrepresented, the IJ must explain proceedings, elicit testimony, and consider all
avenues of relief for which an applicant may be eligible, even if the applicant does not raise them.116 As the Ninth Circuit explained in Dent v.
Holder:
Because aliens appearing pro se often lack the legal knowledge to
navigate their way successfully through the morass of immigration
law, and because their failure to do so successfully might result in
their expulsion from this country, it is critical that the IJ “scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all
the relevant facts.”117

Failure to adequately explain proceedings to a pro se respondent, or failure to elicit testimony that could benefit the respondent, may be grounds
for remand.118 The IJ must meet this double burden—both eliciting facts
and deciding between competing claims—while under pressure to hear
cases quickly in courts that are “severely understaffed.”119
B. The Credibility Determination
The credibility determination presents obstacles that favor the
fraudulent applicant over the genuine asylum seeker, and these obstacles
are heightened by the government withholding documents to use as impeachment evidence. The applicant’s primary means of meeting her burden of proof is through her own testimony.120 The applicant has the right
to call witnesses and to offer documentary evidence to support her claim
or rebut arguments against her.121 Often, however, the applicant does not
have such supporting evidence because “a genuine refugee does not flee
note 31, at 1589–94 (detailing the challenges of obtaining documents in the A-file via FOIA request).
115. Constanza-Martinez v. Holder, 739 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 2014).
116. See, e.g., Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725, 727 (9th Cir. 2000) (remanding the case because
the applicant did not fully understand her rights at the proceeding and because the IJ did not elicit all
relevant testimony).
117. Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 373–74 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d
871, 877 (9th Cir. 2002)).
118. See, e.g., id. (vacating the B.I.A. decision and transferring to District Court); Jacinto, 208
F.3d at 727.
119. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 23, at 383.
120. See, e.g., Singh-Kaur v. INS, 183 F.3d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999) (“An alien must show
by credible, direct, and specific evidence an objectively reasonable basis for the claimed fear of
persecution.”).
121. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(b)(4)(B) (2006).
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her native country armed with affidavits, expert witnesses, and extensive
documentation.”122
The applicant may establish refugee status through her testimony
alone if that testimony is credible, persuasive, detailed, and specific.123 In
determining the applicant’s credibility, the court may consider, among
other things, the applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the
“plausibility” of her account, and the consistency among all of the applicant’s oral or written statements “whenever made and whether or not
under oath.”124 Any inconsistency in the applicant’s story may suffice to
find her not credible.125
To succeed, an applicant must be found credible. It is not easy,
however, to distinguish truth from lies.126 The factors IJs rely upon, especially demeanor and consistency, tend to work against the genuine applicant, specifically in the context of responding to impeachment through
undisclosed documents.
1. Demeanor
To prevail on an asylum claim, not only must the applicant’s testimony be consistent, detailed, and believable, but her demeanor must also
appear appropriate to the events she relates.127 Applicants have been
found not credible based on “hesitant and unresponsive” answers,128 “answers [that are] very short, very tight, and without a natural flow,”129
“evasive demeanor,”130 or simply based on “demeanor” without further

122. Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 26 (2d Cir. 1999).
123. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
124. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006).
125. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a single
inconsistency that goes to the heart of the claim may be grounds for finding the applicant not credible); see also Malkandi v. Holder, 576 F.3d 906, 917 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting the REAL ID Act and
explaining that the IJ may rely on any inaccuracy, regardless of whether it goes to the heart of the
asylum claim, as a basis for an adverse credibility finding), amended and superseded, 544 F.3d 1029
(9th Cir. 2009).
126. See, e.g., James P. Eyster, Searching for the Key in the Wrong Place: Why “Common
Sense” Credibility Rules Consistently Harm Refugees, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 7 (2012) (describing the
fallibility of credibility determinations and noting that experts have about a 50% chance of detecting
intentional lies); GAO ASYLUM REPORT, supra note 15 (stating that a majority of AOs and IJs expressed the need for further training, especially in credibility determinations).
127. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006); see also Matter of Dass, 20 I. & N. Dec. 120, 124
(B.I.A. 1989).
128. Zhi Kai Tian v. Holder, 471 F. App’x 42, 43 (2d Cir. 2012).
129. Jian Jiang v. Holder, 327 F. App’x 275, 276 (2d Cir. 2009).
130. Daci v. INS, 303 F. App’x 956, 957 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Da Lin Zheng v. Holder, 332
F. App’x 709, 710 (2d Cir. 2009).
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explanation.131 However, cultural norms and past trauma may impede the
applicant’s ability to testify in a manner that appears direct, specific, and
emotionally appropriate.
Demeanor that is appropriate in another culture may not conform to
the American preference for directness and forthrightness.132 Asylum
seekers from oppressive regimes may have learned to distrust government officials and may be hesitant or frightened when speaking to authorities.133 Women in particular may have been taught not to make eye
contact and not to reveal private details to strangers.134 These experiences
and cultural norms may cause an applicant to look down, appear nervous
and distrustful, sweat excessively, and hesitate during her hearing—all
things that could lead an IJ to believe, based on her demeanor, that she is
not telling the truth.135
Facial expressions are likewise prone to misinterpretation. For example, as one factor in an adverse credibility finding, the Board of Immigration Appeals (B.I.A.) noted that the applicant “smiled” when revealing a past sexual assault at her hearing, an incident she had not previously mentioned.136 The record revealed, however, that the applicant
smiled and revealed the assault at her hearing because the IJ was a woman; she had not mentioned the incident before because her previous interviewers were men.137
Past trauma may also impede the applicant’s ability to testify in a
manner that appears direct, specific, and emotionally appropriate. According to UNHCR, while 1% of the general population suffers from
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), clinical studies of different refugee populations have revealed rates of PTSD ranging from 39%–
100%.138 People who suffer from PTSD may struggle to recall and relate
traumatic events in detail.139 They may appear withdrawn, uninterested,
131. Ze Feng Zhu v. Holder, 418 F. App’x 11, 13 (2d Cir. 2011); Juntian Zha v. Holder, 439 F.
App’x 628, 629 (9th Cir. 2011).
132. Settlage, supra note 27, at 94. See also Katherine E. Melloy, Telling Truths: How the
REAL ID Act’s Credibility Provisions Affect Women Asylum Seekers, 92 IOWA L. REV. 637, 657–61
(2007).
133. Melloy, supra note 132, at 657.
134. Id; see also Settlage, supra note 27, at 94.
135. Melloy, supra note 132, at 657–58. See also Settlage, supra note 27, at 94.
136. Paramasamy v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002).
137. Id.
138. DEP’T OF INT’L PROT., UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’N FOR REFUGEES, REFUGEE
RESETTLEMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK TO GUIDE RECEPTION AND INTEGRATION 233
(2002) [hereinafter UNHCR RESETTLEMENT GUIDE], available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/
405189284.html.
139. Id.; see also Eyster, supra note 126, at 40 (explaining that “individuals who have suffered
trauma have much less ability to accurately encode, store, and retrieve memories.”).
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and unresponsive.140 Symptoms may be particularly acute when dealing
with public officials.141
Ironically, the fraudulent applicant is better situated to relate a detailed story with appropriate demeanor than the genuine applicant. The
applicant with a false claim typically buys a story or pays an unscrupulous agent to invent a convincing story.142 For example, Nafissatou, mentioned in the Introduction, obtained a cassette tape with a convincing asylum claim.143 She listened to the tape until she memorized the story and
could deliver it with convincing emotion.144 Unencumbered by real, confusing, and painful memories, she was found credible.145
2. Impeaching Through Undisclosed Documents
Each factor that disadvantages the genuine applicant in her direct
testimony works against her even more when ICE seeks to impeach
through undisclosed and unverified documents.146 The ICE attorney assigned to oppose the asylum claim has access to every document in the
A-file and may introduce them without prior disclosure.147 Notes from
the AO interview and the AO’s Assessment to Refer are often used to
impeach the applicant. In Martins v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, the court noted that “in many cases, ICE Trial Attorneys . . . compare court testimony or prior written statements to the notes
140. Melloy, supra note 132, at 653. Melloy states that “[l]ack of emotion can be much more
detrimental to a woman’s credibility than it is to a man’s, due to cultural standards of engendered
emotion.” Id. at 654.
141. UNHCR RESETTLEMENT GUIDE, supra note 138, at 235.
142. See, e.g., United States v. Liu, 239 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2000) (unscrupulous immigration agency used three general asylum stories from which applicants chose one); Pavlov v. Holder,
697 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2012) (detailing evidence of a false application racket); Kirk Semple et
al., Asylum Fraud in Chinatown: An Industry of Lies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/nyregion/asylum-fraud-in-chinatown-industry-oflies.html?_r=0.
143. Dwyer & Wilson, supra note 1; see also Liu, 239 F.3d at 142 (unscrupulous immigration
agency used three general asylum stories and chose one for each applicant); Semple et al., supra note
142.
144. Dwyer & Wilson, supra note 1.
145. Id.; see also Semple et al., supra note 141 (detailing use of memorized stories in asylum
applications).
146. See, e.g., Sharma v. Holder, 457 Fed. App’x 614, 616 (9th Cir. 2011), amended on
denial for reh’g, 249 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2011); Koulibaly v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 613, 618 (6th Cir.
2008); Martins v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1112–13 (N.D. Cal.
2013).
147. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7(a) (2013) (The IJ “may receive in evidence any oral or written statement that is material and relevant to any issue in the case previously made by the respondent or any
other person during any investigation, examination, hearing, or trial.”). See also Martins, 962 F.
Supp. 2d at 1112–13 (explaining the use of undisclosed documents to impeach).
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[from the AO interview] in an effort to identify inconsistencies,
and . . . try to impeach the applicant’s credibility.”148 The fraudulent applicant is more likely to survive impeachment than the genuine applicant
for two reasons: first, by telling a consistent, rehearsed story, the fraudulent applicant leaves herself less open to charges of inconsistency; and
second, the same factors that can make a genuine applicant appear evasive during her direct testimony—cultural norms, PTSD, and negative
experiences with officials—can make it even more difficult for her to
respond to a surprise attack on her truthfulness.
The ICE attorney may use the AO’s interview notes or Assessment
to Refer and argue that the applicant’s testimony is not consistent with
her statements to the AO.149 However, years may pass between filing for
asylum and the hearing before the IJ,150 and the passage of time works
against the genuine applicant. As time passes, the asylum seeker continues to process the traumatic events in her past; through natural memory
processes, some events recede while others come into sharper focus.151
The applicant may thus emphasize different aspects of her story at the
hearing than she did at her AO interview, creating apparent inconsistencies.152 In one study, a group of refugees who had been granted refugee
status before their arrival in the United Kingdom, and whose histories
had been verified, were reinterviewed after their arrival.153 The researchers found that “up to 65% of the details changed between interviews.”154
While a memorized fraudulent story is likely to remain consistent,155 a
genuinely traumatic experience will be told differently over time.156 Any
inconsistency, however, between the testimony at hearing and the notes
from the AO interview, which may have occurred years before, can lead
to impeachment and an adverse credibility finding.157

148. Martins, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1113.
149. See, e.g., id.
150. See, e.g., Settlage, supra note 27, at 100 (noting the asylum process often takes years).
151. Eyster, supra note 126, at 37.
152. See, e.g., id.
153. Id. (citing Jane Herlihy, Peter Scragg & Stuart Turner, Discrepancies in Autobiographical
Memories—Implications for the Assessment of Asylum Seekers: A Repeated Interviews Study, 324
BMJ 324–27 (2002)). The same study found that refugees suffering from PTSD had the highest
levels of inconsistency. Id.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Schurtman & Lillard, supra note 17, at 59–60 (describing an asylum racket in
which applicants memorized stock claims).
156. Eyster, supra note 126, at 37.
157. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(iii) (2009) (establishing that any inconsistency, inaccuracy,
or falsehood may be the basis for an adverse credibility finding); see also Malkandi v. Holder, 576
F.3d 906, 917 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting the REAL ID Act and explaining that the IJ may rely on any
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In addition, the AO notes and Assessment are at least one—and often two—steps removed from what the applicant said. The notes record
the AO’s impression of the applicant’s words, often as relayed through
an interpreter. Room for error exists both in the interpretation and in the
note-taking process.158 In addition, an applicant speaking through an interpreter rarely uses the same interpreter at the interview and at the hearing; even if the applicant tells exactly the same story to two different interpreters, style and word choices may cause the resulting accounts in
English to differ in some details.159 A multilingual applicant may be provided an interpreter for a language that is not her most fluent.160 In addition, the AO’s choices of what information to include in the notes and
what words to use may result in apparent inconsistencies.
Differences in interpretation may also result in apparent inconsistencies. One applicant, for example, testified before the IJ: “They took my
husband and they put chains on him, and they searched the house, and
they took some documents from the bedroom.”161 The ICE attorney
sought to impeach the applicant for inconsistency, relying on the AO’s
Assessment to Refer, according to which the applicant said: “[The soldiers] came into the living room and spoke to my husband . . . . They
took him to the car and drove him away.”162 The applicant explained that
she said the same thing both times, she did not see a conflict between the
two statements, and the different interpreters may have conveyed her
story differently.163 Although the interpreters were not questioned about
the discrepancy, the IJ concluded that the applicant’s “inconsistencies
and overall vagueness” merited an adverse credibility finding.164
Even inconsistencies that result from misunderstanding a question
may be grounds for an attack on credibility. One applicant testified at her
inconsistency, regardless of whether it goes to the heart of the asylum claim, as a basis for an adverse credibility finding).
158. See, e.g., Koulibaly v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 613, 621 (6th Cir. 2008); Sharma v. Holder,
457 Fed. App’x 614, 616 (9th Cir. 2011), amended on denial for reh’g, 249 F.3d 830 (9th Cir.
2011).
159. See, e.g., Koulibaly, 541 F.3d at 622.
160. See Khattak v. Holder, 704 F.3d 197, 200 n.3 (1st Cir. 2013) (declining to make an adverse credibility in the case of a Pakistani applicant, who was most comfortable speaking Urdu but
had a Pashto interpreter at his AO interview, even though the IJ found the differences between the
testimony at hearing and the AO notes “somewhat concerning.”).
161. Koulibaly, 541 F.3d at 621–22.
162. Id. at 622.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 619. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the adverse credibility finding, holding
that the inconsistent statements were not contradictory. Id. at 622. The court also found that the IJ
improperly relied on the Assessment to Refer, which lacked detail and did not indicate in what language the interview was conducted. Id.
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hearing that, among other incidents of past harm, Maoists had threatened
her in 2002.165 The ICE attorney introduced the notes from the AO interview not previously disclosed to the applicant to impeach her.166 The
notes indicated that in her interview, the applicant said that she suffered a
physical attack in 2002.167 The applicant explained the discrepancy by
saying that she was “confused” during the AO interview and had not understood the question.168 The applicant’s explanation was insufficient to
counteract the impression of inconsistency; the IJ found her testimony
not credible and denied her asylum claim.169 On appeal, however, the
Ninth Circuit pointed out that the AO notes in fact confirmed the applicant’s testimony; along with the applicant’s statement about being attacked, the notes included the AO’s opinion that the applicant had not
understood the question.170 In that case, evidence corroborating the asylum seeker’s claim was present in the very document used to impeach
her; however, without access to that document prior to the hearing, the
asylum seeker did not have the opportunity to identify the information
and use it to rebut the challenge to her credibility.171
Detecting and denying fraudulent claims is necessary to preserve
the integrity of the asylum system; thus, credibility is an issue of prime
concern.172 However, several aspects of the credibility determination
serve to heighten the imbalance of immigration proceedings and disadvantage genuine applicants without any corresponding increase in detecting fraud. The genuine applicant may not testify in a manner that appears
convincing and consistent due to cultural norms, natural memory processes, and past trauma. These same traits make it difficult for the genuine applicant to justify herself when presented with an apparent inconsistency. Withholding immigration documents to impeach tests not
whether an applicant’s story is true, but how well the applicant responds
when under pressure and when taken by surprise from an authority figure.

165. Sharma v. Holder, 457 Fed. App’x 614, 616 (9th Cir. 2011), amended on denial for
reh’g, 249 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2011).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Schurtman & Lillard, supra note 17, at 60 (discussing harm to the system caused
by fraudulent immigration practitioners).
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IV. OBTAINING DOCUMENTS VIA FOIA REQUEST: AN INEFFICIENT,
BURDENSOME, AND UNFAIR PROCESS
To lessen the imbalance between the applicant and the ICE attorney
and decrease the risk of being surprised by undisclosed documents at
hearing, the applicant must file a FOIA request with DHS—the agency
conducting her prosecution—and request her own immigration records.173 She may request her entire A-file, including her asylum application, notes from the reasonable fear interview, source material relied upon by the AO, the Assessment to Refer, and any other information she
believes DHS holds.174 The FOIA request is most often met with partial
disclosure. In fiscal year 2012, USCIS processed 145,278 FOIA requests.175 It granted 16,555 requests in full and granted partial disclosure
in 86,270 cases.176 The remaining 42,453 requests were denied.177 While
FOIA is an important tool for government accountability, in the context
of asylum hearings, FOIA unnecessarily increases the burden on the applicant and decreases the efficiency of both DHS and the immigration
courts.
A. FOIA Disadvantages the Most Vulnerable Applicants
The most obvious hurdle for pro se applicants is that they may not
know that FOIA exists or how to use it to get their much-needed documents. In Dent v. Holder, an immigrant in removal proceedings argued
that he was a U.S. citizen and could not be removed.178 He asserted that
his adoptive mother was a U.S. citizen and that she had applied for naturalization on his behalf.179 Although the IJ granted continuances for him
to try to locate his adoptive mother’s birth certificate—as proof of her
173. See, e.g., Martins v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1113
(N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding that “[f]or asylum seekers and their representatives, a FOIA request for the
A-File is often the fastest way—and for many, the only practical way—to secure information from
the A-File that is needed to prepare sufficiently in advance of the merits hearing.”).
174. See, e.g., Abramyan v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 6 F. Supp. 3d 57 (D.D.C. 2013).
175. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2012 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REPORT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL 4 (2013) [hereinafter DHS 2012 FOIA REPORT], available at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/foia/privacy-foia-annual-report-fy-2012-dhs.pdf.
USCIS received 117,787 new FOIA requests in fiscal year 2012 and had 43,568 requests pending at
the start of the year. Id. at 3. Note that while DHS is composed of eighteen distinct agencies, USCIS
processed 70% of DHS’s total FOIA requests (145,278 out of 205,895 total). Id.
176. Id. at 4.
177. Id. Denials were based on several reasons, including: FOIA exemption, no records or
records already referred, request withdrawn, improper FOIA request, fee-related, request improperly
described records. Id.
178. Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 369–70 (9th Cir. 2010).
179. Id.
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citizenship—and his own naturalization application, Dent was unable to
obtain the documents.180 Without such evidence, the IJ ordered him removed to Honduras.181 Unknown to Dent, among the documents in his
A-file was the naturalization application filed by his adoptive mother.182
On his first appeal, Dent “expressly asked for help getting records relating to his mother’s citizenship etc., because he was in jail and his adoptive mother was dead.”183 However, he did not file a FOIA request, and
DHS did not disclose documents to him.184 On appeal before the Ninth
Circuit, DHS argued that absent a proper FOIA request, it had no obligation to disclose documents in its possession.185
For those applicants who know that FOIA exists, they have the burden of providing a description of the records they want disclosed.186 An
applicant who submits only a general description may get few or no documents in return, and her request is not likely to be granted if the applicant is not familiar with the terminology used by DHS to describe herself
or her records. In Abramyan v. United States Department of Homeland
Security, an asylum seeker, through her lawyer, filed a FOIA request
seeking a “complete copy of the Alien File (A-File) (including: all decision information, all applications, all petitions, all notices, all exhibits, all
submissions, all receipts, and any and all documents that consist of the
complete and full Alien file from USCIS).”187 Although the request included the applicant’s full name, her date and place of birth, and the
number of a pending visa, it was denied because it lacked the Alien
Number, the number assigned by DHS to a noncitizen.188
Yet applicants who properly request all of their immigration documents still often receive only partial disclosure. FOIA includes exemptions for nine categories of information that are not subject to disclosure.189 While agencies are not required to disclose information falling
180. Id.
181. Id. at 370.
182. Id. at 374.
183. Id. at 372.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 374. The court strongly chastised DHS for withholding the document, vacated the
removal order, and transferred the case to district court for a determination of whether Dent was a
citizen. Id. at 375. At the time of the transfer, Dent had already had a first trial before an IJ, an appeal to the B.I.A., a second trial before an IJ, a second appeal before the B.I.A., and an appeal to the
Ninth Circuit. Id. at 369.
186. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A)(i) (2009).
187. Abramyan v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 6 F. Supp. 3d 57, 59–60 (D.D.C. 2013).
188. Id. at 60. The request was later granted in part after an appeal by the applicant’s lawyer.
Id.
189. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 (b)(1)–(9) (2009). The exemptions may be summarized as: (1) classified
national defense information; (2) internal agency rules and practices (personnel); (3) information that
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within one or more of these categories, the agency must disclose the
nonprivileged portion if such information is “reasonably segregable”
from the rest of the privileged document.190 In 2012, USCIS relied on six
of the nine FOIA exemptions, and in most cases, the exemption required
only a simple redaction of personal information.191 In Abramyan, for
example, USCIS relied on exemption (b)(6)—which exempts information involving matters of personal privacy—to redact the name of the
interpreter at the applicant’s asylum interview.192 Other exemptions,
however, are asserted to withhold broad categories of information. FOIA
exemption (b)(5) exempts from disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party
other than an agency in litigation with the agency.”193 USCIS has frequently asserted exemption (b)(5) to withhold both the Assessment to
Refer and the AO’s interview notes.194 Subsequently, failure to disclose
the Assessment and AO notes, even after a properly filed FOIA request,
is frequently raised as an issue on FOIA appeal and on appeal following
the immigration hearing.195
B. The FOIA Process Burdens the Agency
The FOIA process entails a significant burden on the agency. Although by law an agency must respond to a FOIA request within twenty
days,196 USCIS and its predecessor, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), have long struggled to meet the statutory time limit.197 In the
1991 case Mayock v. Nelson, the INS argued that although it had failed
is prohibited from disclosure by another federal law; (4) trade secrets and other confidential business
information; (5) inter-agency or intra-agency communications that are protected by legal privileges;
(6) information involving matters of personal privacy; (7) records or information compiled for law
enforcement (with six subcategories); (8) information relating to the supervision of financial institutions; and (9) geological information on wells. Id.
190. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2009).
191. DHS 2012 FOIA REPORT, supra note 175, at 6.
192. Abramyan, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 61.
193. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2009).
194. See, e.g., Abramyan, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 60–62 (withholding both the Assessment and the
notes under exemption (b)(5)); Anguimate v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 918 F. Supp. 2d 13, 18
(D.D.C. 2013) (withholding the Assessment under exemption (b)(5)); but see Martins v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1122–23 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding that the
agency had not met its burden of showing that interview notes fell within exemption (b)(5)).
195. See, e.g., Abramyan, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 62 (challenging the withholding of the Assessment
and the notes under exemption (b)(5)); Anguimate, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (challenging the withholding of the Assessment); Martins, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1109 (requesting an injunction to compel the
agency to disclose AO notes).
196. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6) (2009).
197. See, e.g., Mayock v. Nelson, 938 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1991).
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to timely reply to FOIA requests, the volume of work involved made it
impossible to comply with the statute given agency resources.198 Following the suit, the INS entered into a national settlement agreement under
which it agreed to immediately process expedited requests where the
failure to do so would impair due process rights by, for example, not disclosing documents until after a removal proceeding.199 Nevertheless, in
2011, twenty-seven immigration attorneys submitted declarations “attesting to USCIS’s repeated delays of months and in some cases years in
responding to aliens’ requests for their registration files.”200 The court
found that not only did the plaintiffs establish that USCIS still had a pattern of delay, “the history of past violations by USCIS and its predecessor agency—going at least as far back as [the plaintiff’s] first lawsuit
against INS [in 1991]—demonstrates the persistent character of the violations and supports a finding that the violations are likely to continue.”201 The court again enjoined the agency to comply with the statute.202
In response to the injunction and emphasis from the Obama Administration that agencies improve the timeliness of processing FOIA requests, DHS has increased personnel and expenditures directed to FOIA
processing and has made progress in reducing its backlog.203 However,
even with increased resources, delays are common; in 2012, the average
processing time across all of DHS was seventy-two days,204 far in excess
of the twenty days mandated by law.205
In addition to burdening the applicant and the agency, the FOIA
process increases the burden on immigration courts. The IJ must elicit
testimony and explore avenues of relief for the applicant while serving as
an impartial decisionmaker.206 The IJ does not have a duty to issue subpoenas for evidence or delay a hearing for an applicant to seek information held by government agencies.207 While under pressure to deal
198. Id. at 1007–08.
199. Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 832 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1100 (N.D. Cal.
2011).
200. Id. at 1105.
201. Id. at 1108.
202. Id. at 1120.
203. For example, USCIS entered fiscal year 2012 with a backlog of 35,780 requests. At the
end of fiscal year 2012, it had 10,727 cases backlogged. DHS 2012 FOIA REPORT, supra note 175, at
17, 20.
204. DHS 2013 CHIEF FOIA OFFICER REPORT, supra note 35, at 19.
205. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6) (2009).
206. See, e.g., Constanza-Martinez v. Holder, 739 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 2014); Jacinto v.
INS, 208 F.3d 725, 727–28 (9th Cir. 2000).
207. See, e.g., In re Mohammad J.A. Khalifah, 21 I. & N. Dec. 107, 112 (B.I.A. 1995) (finding
no right to discovery in immigration proceedings).
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efficiently with an enormous caseload,208 the IJ must frequently decide
whether to instruct an applicant about FOIA and whether to continue a
hearing while an applicant waits for and possibly challenges FOIA responses.
C. Policy and Case Law Support Greater and More Efficient Disclosure
Apart from the burdens on the parties mentioned above, administrative policy, case law, and common sense all support a shift to greater disclosure of immigration documents. On January 21, 2009, President
Obama issued a FOIA Memorandum calling for a “presumption of disclosure” and a “spirit of cooperation” in disclosing information.209 The
Attorney General followed up by issuing FOIA Guidelines on March 19,
2009.210 The Guidelines call on agencies to reexamine their FOIA practices in light of a “fundamental commitment to open government.”211 The
Guidelines make clear that “an agency should not withhold information
simply because it may do so legally.”212 The Attorney General “strongly
encourage[s] agencies to make discretionary disclosures of information,”
to disclose information proactively, and to improve efficiency in administering FOIA requests.213
The Guidelines also announced a shift in Department of Justice policy.214 Previously, the Department of Justice defended all agency denials
of FOIA requests that “had a sound legal basis.”215 Under the new policy,
the Department of Justice defends only those denials where “the agency
reasonably foresees” that disclosure would do real harm to one of the
interests protected by the statutory exemptions.216 In other words, it is no
longer enough that information may fall into an exempted category; rather, to deny a FOIA request, the agency must have a legitimate reason to
believe that the disclosure would cause harm.217 As the Attorney General
summarized, “bureaucratic hurdles have no place” in a transparent government.218
208. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 23, at 383.
209. Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Parties and Agencies from the President of the
United States Concerning the Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-01-26/pdf/E9-1773.pdf.
210. Holder Memo, supra note 35.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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Additionally, case law is increasingly calling for greater disclosure.
While agency withholding of AO notes, Assessments to Refer, and other
documents in the A-file has been widely practiced, several recent decisions have either required disclosure or called into question the use of
such documents, when not previously disclosed, to impeach. The practice
of withholding AO notes under FOIA exemption (b)(5) was successfully
challenged in Martins v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services.219 In Martins, the court noted that while DHS once commonly disclosed AO notes in response to a FOIA request, recent practice has been
for the agency to withhold the notes220 under FOIA exemption (b)(5).221
At the same time, ICE trial attorneys have increasingly relied upon the
notes to impeach at hearing.222 The court gave DHS two weeks to provide a detailed explanation of why the notes fall within the claimed exemption, and held that “if the notes are similar to the examples in the
record . . . it is the court’s holding that the notes are not subject to the
deliberative process privilege, and the court does not expect them . . . to
be withheld on that ground.”223 In response, in November 2013, USCIS
entered into a settlement in which it agreed that AO notes did not fall
under the deliberative process exemption.224 USCIS agreed to instruct
“officers, employees, and agents involved in the processing of FOIA requests” that records reflecting information obtained at asylum interviews
“shall be produced.”225 While USCIS retains the right to withhold the
notes based on other exemptions, the settlement precludes “the withholding of such documents on the basis that asylum interview notes are generically protected . . . by virtue of their status as asylum interview
notes.”226
Similarly, in 2005 the Ninth Circuit called into question the use of
Assessments to Refer and other documents from the asylum interview to
impeach the applicant’s credibility.227 In Singh v. Gonzalez, the IJ found
the applicant not credible, based in part on inconsistencies between his
219. Martins v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1130 (N.D. Cal.
2013).
220. Id. at 1114–15.
221. Id. at 1119.
222. Id. at 1115.
223. Id. at 1129. The court noted that the detailed explanation, or Vaughn index, is necessary in
order for FOIA to function. Id.
224. Settlement Agreement and Order of Dismissal at 2, Martins v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. C-13-00591-LB (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://www.courthouse
news.com/2013/11/21/immsett.pdf.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2005).

1096

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 38:1069

testimony at hearing and his statements to the AO as recorded in the Assessment to Refer.228 The B.I.A. affirmed.229 However, on appeal before
the Ninth Circuit, the court found that the asylum interview is a “potentially unreliable point of comparison . . . for purposes of a credibility determination.”230 Although the IJ compared Singh’s testimony with his
statements in the Assessment to Refer, there was “no indication from the
record that Singh received a copy of the Assessment to Refer . . . at any
time before the IJ issued her decision.”231 The Ninth Circuit identified
numerous problems with relying on the Assessment to Refer to impeach:
the Assessment did not indicate the language in which the interview was
conducted;232 Singh was “not asked about whether the asylum officer’s
report of the interview was accurate,” either at the time of the interview
or at the hearing;233 and the AO did not testify to confirm the contents of
his notes or reports.234 Finally, the court noted that the 1995 amendments
to asylum procedures reduced the authority of the AO, and arguably reduced the expectation that the AO keep accurate and reliable records of
the asylum interview:
The amendment of the regulations effectively removed the two
principal functions—preparing a written assessment of the claim
and rendering a written decision—that would require, or at least
provide an impetus for, in the majority of asylum interviews, an
asylum officer to keep an accurate and reliable record of the applicant’s statements during the interview.235

The court found that the Assessment to Refer lacked sufficient indicia of
reliability to support the adverse credibility finding and remanded for
further proceedings, accepting Singh’s testimony as credible.236
The 2009 case Cinapian v. Holder focused on the fundamental unfairness of using undisclosed and unverified documents to impeach.237 In
Cinapian, an Iranian national applied for asylum based on targeted persecution of Christians in her home country.238 She filed various support228. Id.
229. Id. at 1083.
230. Id. at 1087.
231. Id. at 1086.
232. Id. at 1088.
233. Id. at 1086.
234. Id. at 1088.
235. Id. (quoting In re R-S-J, 22 I. & N. Dec. 863, 881–82 (B.I.A. 1999)). See 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.14(c)(1) (2011).
236. Singh, 403 F.3d at 1092–93.
237. See Cinapian v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2009).
238. Id. at 1070–71.
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ing documents with her asylum application, including her birth certificate
and a Christianity Certificate prepared by a church in Iran.239 Her claim
was referred to immigration court.240 At the hearing, DHS—represented
by an ICE attorney—introduced a previously undisclosed forensic report
that cast doubt on the authenticity of the birth certificate and the Christianity Certificate.241 Although the IJ informed DHS that it should have
disclosed the forensic report, she refused to grant a continuance and
found the applicant not credible.242
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that relying on the forensic report
to undermine credibility was fundamentally unfair.243 Even assuming that
the forensic report had been prepared properly and without bias, “a variety of possible innocuous explanations for a document’s apparent lack of
authenticity may exist.”244 Had the applicant known that the authenticity
of the documents was in doubt, she could have obtained further corroborating evidence; similarly, had the forensic examiner testified, the applicant could have cross-examined her regarding her degree of certainty and
the number of times she had examined similar documents from Iran.245
The court held that “the combination of the government’s failure to disclose the DHS forensic reports in advance of the hearing or to make the
reports’ author available for cross-examination . . . denied [the applicant]
a fair hearing.”246
In the Dent case, described above, the Ninth Circuit held that in removal proceedings, the applicant has “mandatory access” to his A-file.247
The court stated that “Congress has provided that to meet his burden of
proof in removal proceedings, ‘the alien shall have access’ to his entry
document ‘and any other records and documents, not considered by the
Attorney General to be confidential, pertaining to the alien’s admission
or presence in the United States.’”248 Rejecting DHS’s argument that absent a FOIA request it had no obligation to disclose records, the court
held that “this mandatory access law entitled Dent to his A-file” regardless of whether he had filed a FOIA request.249 Despite the court’s clear
language, DHS has construed Dent to apply only in the Ninth Circuit and
239. Id. at 1071.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1071–72.
242. Id. at 1072.
243. Id. at 1075.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 374 (9th Cir. 2010).
248. Id.
249. Id.
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only to cases in which a person raises a citizenship claim.250 However,
there is good reason to apply the holding in Dent to all asylum hearings.
V. TOWARDS GREATER TRANSPARENCY IN ASYLUM PROCEEDINGS
Simpler, faster, and fuller disclosure of records in affirmative asylum adjudications would improve the fairness and transparency of the
proceedings, increase the reliability of credibility determinations, encourage efficiency, and reduce costs. Unlike substantive immigration
reforms that require congressional action, procedural changes to disclosure are not only within the discretion of USCIS, they are necessary to
bring agency policy into harmony with the guidelines established by the
Obama Administration, the policy established by DHS, and the trend of
case law. USCIS should proactively disclose to the applicant much if not
all of the information in the A-file, including research materials relied
upon by the AO, the AO notes, and the Assessment to Refer. This disclosure would require USCIS to apply a presumption of openness to the
contents of the A-file and to empower the AO to make an initial review
of the A-file for sensitive information.
A. Proactive Disclosure to Asylum Applicants
The asylum seeker referred to immigration court has a certain need
for her immigration records held by USCIS. In harmony with policy
guidelines calling for transparency251 and case law mandating disclosure,252 the applicant should not have to request documents that she
needs, that must be disclosed to her, and that are within the agency’s
possession. Rather, copies of these documents should be delivered to her
at the same time as the Notice to Appear. The current system requires a
FOIA request even for documents that are necessary to the applicant and
that do not fall within a FOIA exception. This disadvantages applicants
who are unaware of the FOIA process253 and adds unnecessary costs and
delay to both the applicant and the agency. A presumption of proactive
disclosure should exist regarding research materials relied upon by the
AO, AO interview notes, and the Assessment to Refer.

250. Heeren, supra note 31, at 1587.
251. Holder Memo, supra note 35.
252. See e.g., Dent, 627 F.3d at 374.
253. See, e.g., id. at 373–74; Abramyan v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 6 F. Supp. 3d 57, 60
(D.D.C. 2013) (describing DHS withholding of documents when request did not include Alien
Number).

2015]

A Presumption of Disclosure in Asylum Proceedings

1099

1. Research Materials Should Be Proactively Disclosed
Research materials, including Department of State country reports,
reports from human rights organizations, and other third-party sources,
are valuable “extrinsic evidence” that provide context and serve as a
plausibility check on the applicant’s story.254 The AO is encouraged to
access such research and may rely on inconsistency between the applicant’s story and extrinsic evidence as a reason for referring the claim to
immigration court.255 Until 1997, applicants had a statutory right to examine and respond to materials relied upon by the AO; under current
law, however, the AO is not required to provide, cite, or even name
source materials.256 While the Assessment to Refer often includes citations to common source material, such as a Department of State country
report, at times citations are either lacking entirely or are too obscure to
enable access to the cited source.257
Disclosing the resources relied upon is necessary for the fair and
accurate determination of asylum claims. As the Third Circuit noted, “in
the troubled areas of the planet from which asylum claims tend to come,
the pace of change is rapid—oppressive regimes rise and fall, and conditions improve and worsen . . . .”258 Source materials may be inaccurate,
incomplete, or outdated.259 Requiring that reliable citations to source materials be included in the Assessment to Refer would aid both the ICE
attorney and the applicant. While ICE attorneys have frequently offered
the Assessment to Refer as impeachment evidence, courts have become
increasingly skeptical of accepting unsupported assertions contained in
Assessments. In Singh, the court emphasized that evidence presented
against an applicant requires substantial “indicia of credibility”; the simple assertion of an AO is not enough.260 Inconsistencies between the ap254. See, e.g., Lialko v. Ashcroft, 111 F. App’x 134, 135 (3d Cir. 2004); AFFIRMATIVE
ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 83, at 21−22.
255. AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 83, at 21−22.
256. See Proposed Rules: Rules and Procedures for Adjudication of Applications for Asylum
or Withholding of Deportation and for Employment Authorization, 59 Fed. Reg. 14779, 14789
(1994) (proposing to eliminate the provisions requiring an Asylum Officer to provide the applicant
with an opportunity to inspect, explain, or rebut the material(s) relied upon to find that the applicant’s claim has not been approved); 59 Fed. Reg. 62284, 62293 (1994) (noting that the change had
been finalized).
257. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Hemed v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:2013cv00129 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2013),, available at http://s3.documentcloud.org/
documents/564080/dc-1-2013cv00129-complaint.txt (listing several examples of obscure citations).
258. Leia v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 427, 437 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378
F.3d 314, 327 (3d Cir. 2004)).
259. See, e.g., id. (noting that the B.I.A. relied on a country report that was four years old).
260. Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005).
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plicant’s story and reported country conditions should be demonstrated
by offering the source material as evidence, not through secondhand assertions.
It is not enough, however, to cite research materials in an Assessment that is then withheld from the applicant. Without access to the
sources relied upon, the applicant has no opportunity to rebut inaccurate
or outdated evidence.261 For research materials to be meaningful aids in
determining the truth of an asylum claim, both sides must have opportunity to examine and rebut the research relied upon. The sources relied
upon by the AO should be disclosed to the applicant along with the referral notice.
2. AO Notes Should Be Proactively Disclosed
AO notes should also be proactively disclosed. Per USCIS policy,
AO notes are an “accurate” and “objective” record of the applicant’s asylum interview.262 The notes do not contain opinions or inferences from
the AO,263 and cannot properly be considered “part of the deliberative
process.”264 In most cases, the notes are the only record of the interview.265 The notes are frequently relied upon as evidence of the contents
of the applicant’s statement and her demeanor during her AO interview.266 In most cases, however, the applicant never reviews those
notes.267 The notes may contain errors or misunderstandings that the applicant is powerless to rebut unless she has access to the notes.
The current process of requiring the applicant to file a FOIA request to obtain the interview notes is particularly unnecessary in light of
the Martins settlement, which established that AO interview notes will
no longer be withheld under the deliberative process exemption.268
Withholding AO notes until a FOIA request is properly filed creates unnecessary expense for the agency, unnecessary delay for the applicant,
261. See, e.g., Musalo, supra note 7, at 378 (petitioning the B.I.A. to reexamine the IJ’s adverse credibility finding because the applicant produced, after her hearing, expert evidence to rebut
the assertion that her claim was implausible). The denial of asylum was later overturned. See In re
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358–59 (B.I.A. 1996).
262. AOBTC INTERVIEWING PART 2, supra note 86, at 5–6.
263. Id.
264. Abramyan v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 6 F. Supp. 3d 57, 61 (D.D.C. 2013).
265. See, e.g., Sharma v. Holder, 457 Fed. App’x 614, 616 (9th Cir. 2011), amended on denial
for reh’g, 249 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2011).
266. See, e.g., Martins v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1113
(N.D. Cal. 2013); Sharma, 457 Fed. App’x at 616.
267. See, e.g., Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005).
268. Settlement Agreement and Order of Dismissal at 2, Martins v. USCIS, No. C-13-00591LB (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://www.courthousenews.com/2013/11/21/immsett.pdf.
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and disadvantages applicants who are unaware of FOIA. Conversely,
disclosing the notes from the AO interview to the applicant with the referral notice would increase fairness, transparency, and efficiency.
3. The Assessment to Refer Should Be Proactively Disclosed
Assessments to Refer are generally withheld under FOIA exemption (b)(5), which protects communications originating within a government agency that are “pre-decisional” and “part of the deliberative process.”269 While there is no question that the government can demonstrate,
“as a technical matter,”270 that Assessments fall within the inter-agency
FOIA exemption,271 disclosure of the Assessment to Refer would lead to
a more fair and efficient process without impeding the government’s
ability to detect and deny fraudulent asylum claims. Under FOIA Guidelines, information should not be withheld merely because it could legally
fit within an exemption, but rather should only be withheld if the agency
“reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm” a protected interest.272
Accordingly, in 2012 DHS instituted a requirement that when recommending that information be withheld, program offices provide a “harm
analysis” detailing the harm that could result from disclosure.273 Thus,
Assessments to Refer should not be withheld unless the agency reasonably foresees—and details in an analysis—the harm that could result from
disclosure. USCIS has not and cannot meet this burden.
The Assessment to Refer serves the same purpose and contains the
same information as the NOID. 274 The only difference between the two
documents is the status of the applicant.275 If the applicant has a current
visa, the AO issues the NOID directly to her.276 If the applicant does not
have a current visa, the AO issues the Assessment to Refer to ICE, who
assigns a trial attorney to argue for removal.277

269. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2009). See, e.g., Anguimate v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 918 F.
Supp. 2d 13, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2013) (affirming the agency’s withholding of the Assessment to Refer
under exemption (b)(5)); Abramyan, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 63, 66–67 (affirming withholding the Assessment to Refer and the AO interview notes under exemption (b)(5)). See also Dep’t of Interior v.
Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2001) (explaining the limits of exemption
(b)(5)).
270. Holder Memo, supra note 35.
271. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2009).
272. Holder Memo, supra note 35.
273. DHS 2013 CHIEF FOIA OFFICER REPORT, supra note 35, at 10.
274. AOBTC WRITING PART 1, supra note 96, at 7–10. See also supra Part II.D.2.b.
275. AOBTC WRITING PART 1, supra note 96, at 6–7.
276. Id. at 7.
277. Id. at 5, 7.
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Thus, the same information contained in the Assessment to Refer is
routinely and proactively disclosed to the in-status applicant in the
NOID. Far from harming a protected interest, disclosing the NOID to the
asylum applicant results in a fairer and more accurate determination of
credibility. According to a USCIS memorandum, “the NOID is designed . . . so that the filer can understand why the evidence submitted
has not been persuasive and can have the best chance to overcome the
deficiency if possible.”278 After receiving the NOID, the in-status applicant has sixteen days to respond.279 She may submit explanations of her
own testimony, research materials that support her claim, or affidavits
from experts or other witnesses.280 USCIS has never argued that disclosing the NOID and allowing the applicant the opportunity to respond hinders the government’s ability to make an accurate determination of credibility, nor is there any evidence to support the assertion.
Under both administrative guidelines and DHS policy, USCIS may
only withhold the Assessment to Refer if the agency reasonably foresees
that disclosure will harm a protected interest and can describe that harm
in detail.281 However, the same information is routinely disclosed to instatus applicants without harm.282 USCIS cannot justify the blanket withholding of Assessments to Refer except by recourse to legal technicalities, relying on exactly the kind of “bureaucratic hurdles” that have no
place in an open government.283
The Assessment to Refer should be disclosed to the applicant without need for a FOIA request in the same way that the NOID is disclosed
to the in-status applicant. Such proactive disclosure would pose no risk to
a protected interest, but would increase the fairness, transparency, and
efficiency of asylum proceedings.
B. A Presumption of Disclosure
While most proposals for immigration reform are predicated on
new legislation or radical changes to existing procedures, proactive disclosure of routine documents requires only a shift in agency approach.
Under the current presumption of nondisclosure, records in an immigrant’s A-file are presumed to be off-limits and are only disclosed, if at
278. Interoffice Memorandum from William R. Yates, Associate Director of Operations,
USCIS (Feb. 16, 2005), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_
Files_Memoranda/Archives%201998-2008/2005/rfe021605.pdf.
279. AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 83, at 27.
280. Id. at 34–35.
281. Holder Memo, supra note 35.
282. AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 83, at 34–35.
283. Holder Memo, supra note 35.
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all, after a lengthy and bureaucratic request process. This presumption of
nondisclosure, however, is counterproductive in at least three ways: it
decreases the integrity of the hearing, increases the cost to the agency,
and undermines trust in the immigration system.
1. Nondisclosure Does Not Lead to More Accurate Hearings
The practice of nondisclosure hinders the IJ’s decisionmaking and
invites error. Credibility is notoriously difficult to judge.284 A full and
fair credibility determination is based on “substantial evidence” from
both parties, not on “speculation” and “conjecture.”285 The current reliance on nondisclosure may make it easier for the ICE attorney to impeach an applicant, but there is no evidence that it leads to more accurate
credibility determinations; instead, the practice arguably disadvantages
genuine applicants.286
In addition, the practice of nondisclosure encourages ICE to take
legal shortcuts by relying on unsupported statements and
nonauthenticated documents.287 For example, relying on the AO’s notes
or assertions in the Assessment to Refer without calling the AO to testify, without corroborating the AO’s assertions, and without allowing the
applicant to prepare a rebuttal is a legal shortcut that would not be tolerated in criminal court.288 Such shortcuts may quickly undermine an applicant’s credibility, but “shortcuts frequently turn out to be mistakes.”289
The courts “should not encourage the cutting of corners by an agency
having such significant responsibilities.”290

284. Eyster, supra note 126, at 8 (noting that even experts have little more than a 50% success
rate at distinguishing truth from lies).
285. Joseph v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d
1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000)).
286. See supra Part III.B.
287. See, e.g., Martins v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1106
(N.D. Cal. 2013); Cinapian v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2009).
288. See, e.g., Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2005); FED. R. EVID. 801–802
(defining hearsay and prohibiting its use at trial).
289. Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Cinapian, 567 F.3d at
1076–77 (finding that “[w]hen the government fails to notify Petitioners in advance of the hearing of
evidence and also does not take reasonable steps to make the preparer of that evidence available for
cross-examination at the hearing, the proper course is for the IJ either to grant a continuance or to
refuse to admit the evidence”).
290. Urooj v. Holder, 734 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Navia–Duran v. INS, 568
F.2d 803, 811 (1st Cir. 1977)).
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2. Nondisclosure Is Expensive
Not only does nondisclosure inhibit the agency from detecting
fraud, it unnecessarily increases agency costs and undermines trust in the
immigration system. The presumption of nondisclosure increases agency
costs because it routes all documents in the A-file through the FOIA administrator, even the most innocuous documents likely to be disclosed if
requested. While some information may need a full review by a FOIA
administrator, many routine documents do not pose a “reasonably foreseeable” risk of harm and could be disclosed without a full FOIA review.
A presumption of openness would allow for many documents to be proactively disclosed, taking them out of the FOIA backlog entirely and saving agency resources.
Nondisclosure also increases costs and decreases efficiency by
opening the door to appeal. Although impeaching through undisclosed
documents is a longstanding practice, case law has increasingly held that
the documents used to impeach may not themselves be reliable and may
need corroborating evidence, such as testimony by the author, if relied
upon to attack credibility.291 In Singh, Cinapian, Koulibaly, and many
other cases, nondisclosure led to a lengthy and expensive journey
through the administrative system and the courts of appeal.292
Nondisclosure is also costly because it undermines confidence in
the immigration system. By increasing opacity and heightening the imbalance between the parties, nondisclosure fosters distrust of the legal
system.293 The asylum seeker already has the burden of proving that she
meets the definition of a refugee and merits a discretionary grant of asylum. The presumption of nondisclosure creates the additional burden of
guessing what information the government may have, requesting it
properly, and preparing to rebut documents she has never seen.294 The

291. See, e.g., Joseph v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1235, 1243 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the use of notes
from less formal proceedings to impeach during formal removal proceeding); Cinapian, 567 F.3d at
1076–77 (finding error where the IJ admitted DHS forensic reports at hearing without calling the
forensic examiner to testify regarding her conclusions); Koulibaly v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 613, 620–
21 (6th Cir. 2008); Singh, 403 F.3d at 1085.
292. See, e.g., Cinapian, 567 F.3d at 1067; Koulibaly, 541 F.3d at 613; Singh, 403 F.3d at
1081.
293. See, e.g., Schurtman & Lillard, supra note 17, at 60 (discussing the consequences of
“notario fraud” and noting the perception in some immigrant communities that it is impossible to get
justice from the U.S. legal system).
294. See, e.g., Leia v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 427, 430–32 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that in arriving at
an adverse credibility determination, the IJ relied in part on the applicant’s failure to produce evidence corroborating the authenticity of documents he had previously submitted and in part on inconsistency between the applicant’s testimony and undisclosed country reports).
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manifest injustice and imbalance of a system where the government does
not “fight fair” creates an incentive to circumvent that system.295
3. Openness Should Be the Presumption
The Attorney General has urged agencies to adopt a presumption of
openness, making “discretionary” and “proactive” disclosures even when
not required to do so by law.296 The current presumption of nondisclosure
leads to a reflexive withholding of information that, as described above,
is both ineffective and inefficient.
In contrast, a presumption of openness would result in a different
attitude toward the information stored in the A-file. While the A-file may
contain documents that are genuinely sensitive, in most cases, it contains
routine records. A presumption of openness would lead USCIS staff to
examine the A-file not with a view to how much can be withheld but
with the expectation that most, if not all, of the information will be disclosed. In turn, an expectation of proactive disclosure would bypass the
need for a FOIA request for many routine documents. As the court held
in Dent, the noncitizen in a removal proceeding should have “mandatory
access” to her A-file, whether she files a FOIA request or not:297 “The
only practical way to give an alien access [to his A-file] is to furnish him
with a copy . . . . We are unable to imagine a good reason for not producing the A-file routinely without a request . . . .”298
C. The AO as the First Decisionmaker
Finally, in order to make proactive disclosure practical, USCIS
must empower the AO to be the first decisionmaker. Presuming that the
A-file will be disclosed and that not all information requires a full FOIA
review before disclosure, the first decisions about the sensitivity of information should be made by the person most familiar with that information: the AO.
Agencies generate vast quantities of records. A FOIA request cannot reasonably be foreseen for the majority of these records; thus, records
are archived to be accessible if requested. FOIA administrators have the
job of receiving FOIA requests, searching for the requested information,
and responding to the request with full disclosure, partial disclosure, or a

295. Schurtman & Lillard, supra note 17, at 60.
296. Holder Memo, supra note 35.
297. Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 374 (9th Cir. 2010).
298. Id. at 374–75.
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denial.299 However, in the context of asylum referrals, this procedure is
redundant and inefficient. Unlike most agency records, the A-file is almost sure to be requested by an asylum applicant who is referred to immigration court; decisions about disclosure could thus be made before
the file is ever stored.
The AO knows the A-file thoroughly; she researches the information in the A-file before interviewing the applicant. The AO takes the
interview notes and writes the Assessment to Refer. The AO also deals
with multiple asylum applications and sees multiple A-files; she is in the
best position to notice if a file contains unusual and sensitive information. Rather than a FOIA administrator who sees a file for the first
time when it is requested, the AO is the logical person to make an initial
determination if information must be redacted or withheld. An initial
FOIA review by the AO would empower the AO to determine which
documents can be disclosed as is, redact those documents that contain
sensitive information that is easily segregable, and flag those documents
that require a more thorough review by a FOIA administrator.
Working cooperatively with non-FOIA staff in order to improve efficiency is specifically encouraged in the FOIA Guidelines,300 and several agencies have already begun to integrate non-FOIA staff into their
processing systems.301 To effectively implement a preliminary review by
the AO, the agency would have to provide training and decrease AO
caseloads;302 such adjustments in workload would allow AOs to handle
fewer cases more thoroughly while at the same time significantly increasing the efficiency and decreasing the cost of FOIA administration.
The AO, who makes the initial decision concerning the applicant’s
eligibility, should also make the initial decision regarding disclosure. The
AO should be empowered to give the applicant not only a Notice to Appear in immigration court, but also the documents necessary to prepare
for that hearing.

299. See, e.g., DHS 2013 CHIEF FOIA OFFICER REPORT, supra note 35 (describing the work of
FOIA administration, the personnel devoted to it, and efforts to improve efficiency).
300. Holder Memo, supra note 35.
301. Office of Info. Policy, OIP Guidance: President Obama’s FOIA Memorandum and Attorney General Holder’s FOIA Guidelines - Creating a New Era of Open Government, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/foia-post-2009-creating-new-era-opengovernment.
302. Settlage, supra note 27, at 80 (discussing need to decrease AO caseload to increase accuracy).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Domestic and international law recognize the extreme vulnerability
of people who are targets of persecution in their home countries due to
their race, religion, political opinion, nationality, or social group. To provide a measure of refuge, asylum law prohibits returning such vulnerable
individuals to countries where their life or freedom is threatened.
The number of affirmative asylum cases is relatively small, but the
stakes are high for all parties; for the applicant, asylum may be the difference between life and death. The government is bound by law and
treaty not to return refugees to countries in which they face a wellfounded fear of threat to life or freedom, but it must also detect the false
claims that accompany the genuine. AOs and IJs seek to make fair and
just determinations while working within time and resource constraints.
The current procedure for disclosure of information in affirmative
asylum cases is not only unnecessarily burdensome, it leads to inaccurate
determinations of credibility and decreases efficiency in USCIS and immigration court. A presumption of disclosure in asylum hearings is not a
substitute for comprehensive immigration reform, but it is a possible and
pragmatic step that would increase both fairness and efficiency.

